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I. INTRODUCTION
In July of 1984 Congress amended the Surface Transportation
Assistance Act of 1982' to require the states either to raise their
minimum drinking age to twenty-one or forfeit a percentage of
their federal highway grant.2 This congressional action forced the
states to make an extremely difficult decision. The states either
could enact a law that their residents might not support or forego
the federal highway funds that the states desperately needed to
complete important highway improvements. Many states were dis-
pleased with both options and challenged the constitutionality of
Congress' conditional spending program.3
The states' legal challenge has initiated renewed discussion on
the limits of Congress' powers to spend and to attach conditions to
the receipt of federal funds. These issues have attracted little at-
1. 23 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. III 1985).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 791 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1986), afl'd, 107 S. Ct. 2793
(1987). The states of Colorado, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyoming jointly filed an amicus brief with the
United States Supreme Court arguing with South Dakota that the amendment violated the
Constitution. Brief for Amicus Curiae for the States of Colorado, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mon-
tana, Ohio, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wyoming, South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793
(1987) (No. 86-260); Brief for Amicus Curiae of Mountain States Legal Foundation and the
State of New Mexico, South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987) (No. 86-260); Brief for
Amicus Curiae for the States of Colorado, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, Ohio, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyoming, South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987)
(No. 86-260) (on petition for writ of certiorari).
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tention from constitutional scholars. A three volume treatise on
constitutional law published in 1986 devoted only fourteen pages
to the entire topic. 4 The most recent debate over the spending
power concluded sixty-five years ago when the Supreme Court first
articulated its analysis of conditions attached to federal grants to
the states. The analysis has remained virtually unchanged since
that time.5 Comprised mainly of what the courts have called the
"coercion test," the Court's analysis has not been applied to invali-
date a single federal grant program in the last fifty years.6 Con-
gress, however, has dramatically increased its use of conditional
spending schemes to accomplish policy objectives. 7 From this in-
creased use of conditions on federal grants, a new debate over the
extent and nature of those conditions has emerged. The debate re-
examines the role of conditions in federal grant programs and fo-
cuses on whether the Constitution limits the conditions that Con-
gress may attach to federal grants to the states.'
The constitutional problems involved in this new debate result
from the cumulative impact of three factors. First, the Supreme
Court has held that the Constitution allows Congress to spend for
very local purposes.9 Second, the Court has held that the Constitu-
tion does not prohibit Congress from attaching whatever condi-
tions Congress wishes to federal grants to the states because state
and local governments have the theoretical option to decline par-
ticipation in the federal grant program.10 And third, the size of the
federal government has increased tremendously. The combination
of these three factors has allowed Congress to erode the allocation
of powers between the state and federal governments by attaching
conditions to local projects with greater frequency and more perva-
4. R. ROrUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE (1986). The three volume treatise contains 2181 pages of substantive text.
5. Compare, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1922) (stating that "[i]f
Congress enacted [the spending program] with the ulterior purpose of tempting [the states]
to yield [part of their reserved rights], that purpose may be effectively frustrated by the
simple expedient of not yielding") with South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 2797 (1987)
(stating that "United States v. Butler. . . established that the constitutional limitations on
Congress when exercising its spending power are less exacting than those on its authority to
regulate directly") (citation omitted).
6. Lovell, Evolving Local Government Dependency, 41 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 189, 192
(1981).
7. Cappalli, Mandates Attached to Federal Grants: Sweet and Sour Federalism, 13
URB. LAW. 143, 143-44 (1981).
8. See, e.g., Dole, 107 S. Ct. at 2799 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
9. See infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.




This Note discusses the Supreme Court's spending power
analysis, most specifically the coercion test, in the context of fed-
eral grants to the states. Part II surveys spending power doctrine,
explains the rationale behind current spending power analysis, and
discusses the origin of the coercion test." Part III analyzes the im-
pact that Congress' use of the spending power and conditional
grants has on decisionmaking and the structure of state govern-
ment under the current coercion test.12 Part IV analyzes the theo-
retical weaknesses of the coercion test and why the courts have
rejected the test in other areas of constitutional adjudication.
13
Part V proposes the adoption of a new analysis that would identify
conditions authorized .by the spending power and restrictions au-
thorized by Congress' other enumerated powers. Part V also ex-
plains how the courts already have built the foundation for the
adoption of such an analysis.14 Part VI concludes by stressing the
urgent need to revise the spending power analysis as applied to
conditional grants to the states.
1 5
II. DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT SPENDING POWER DOCTRINE
Congress derives its power to spend from Article 1, section 8 of
the United States Constitution."0 In general, Congress may spend
to aid the "general Welfare. 1 7 Congress realized, however, that ex-
penditures alone are not always sufficient to achieve general wel-
fare objectives. Attaching conditions to federal expenditures has
allowed Congress to tailor spending programs more closely to these
objectives. The debate over the extent of the spending power has
centered on what conditions Congress legitimately may attach to
spending grants.
11. See infra notes 16-70 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 71-113 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 114-51 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 152-94 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
16. Article 1, section 8, clause 1 of the United States Constitution provides, "The Con-
gress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but
all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." The "com-
mon Defence" language has not been fully interpreted by the courts, which have assumed
that "general Welfare" includes the "common Defence." Cf. Dole, 107 S. Ct. at 2796.




A. The Power to Spend
1. Historical Development
The first controversy over the spending power concerned the
purposes for which the federal government could spend. The Con-
stitution provides that Congress may spend only for the "general
Welfare," a phrase which historically has been interpreted at least
three different ways. 18 The first interpretation was that the clause
authorizes Congress to legislate rather than spend for the general
welfare; that interpretation was quickly denounced. 19 Persons op-
posed to ratification of the Constitution advanced this broad read-
ing of the general welfare clause in order to discredit the Constitu-
tion and undermine its public support. 20 The drafters responded
by stating that the detractors had interpreted the clause errone-
ously: if the clause did permit Congress to legislate for the general
welfare, then the Constitution did not need to specify the other
enumerated powers.2 Rather, according to the drafters, the gen-
eral welfare clause modifies only the taxing and spending powers. 2
The second interpretation limited general welfare objectives to
interests delineated by Congress' other enumerated powers.23 This
interpretation would have allowed Congress to use the taxing and
spending power only as a means of executing listed governmental
powers. The Court rejected this interpretation in United States v.
Butler24 and formulated the third, and current, interpretation. In
Butler the Court addressed the constitutionality of the Agricul-
18. Cole, The Federal Spending Power and Unconditional and Block Grants to State
and Local Government, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 616, 624 (1982).
19. Id. at 625.
20. Id.; see also Comment, The Federal Conditional Spending Power: A Search for
Limits, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 293, 296-97 & n.21 (1975).
21. Id.
22. Butler, 297 U.S. at 64 (stating that "the view that the clause grants power to pro-
vide for the general welfare, independently of the taxing [and spending] power has never
been authoritatively accepted").
23. This interpretation of the general welfare clause marks the beginning of the debate
between James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. Madison believed that the general wel-
fare clause merely encompassed all of the enumerated powers of Congress. Hamilton, on the
other hand, argued that the general welfare clause extended beyond the enumerated powers,
but modified only the taxing and spending power. See generally id. at 65-67; Helvering, 301
U.S. at 640; Cole, supra note 18, at 625-29. Presidents had used their veto powers very
aggressively to thwart many expenditures for local purposes. Therefore, few cases reached
the Court before Butler. Id.
24. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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tuial Adjustment Act (AAA).2 5 The New Deal program used the
proceeds of a tax on agricultural processors to subsidize farmers
who agreed to take land out of production. Congress and the Presi-
dent designed the program to reduce food production in the hope
that a diminished supply would stimulate the prices of agricultural
products. The federal government, in defense of the program, con-
ceded that Congress' other enumerated powers did not support the
Act, but asserted that Congress' power to tax and spend could.26
The Court agreed in principle, stating, "[T]he power of Congress
to authorize expenditures of public moneys for public purposes is
not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the
Constitution.
'27
2. Scope of Permissible Spending Objectives
According to Butler, Congress' other enumerated powers do
not limit the general welfare objectives for which Congress may ex-
ercise its spending power. Any restriction on the scope of the
spending power originates instead with the Supreme Court's defi-
nition of general welfare. The Court's analysis has distinguished
expenditures for the "general" welfare from those for a "particu-
lar" welfare,28 equating general welfare with national interests.2
Thus, Congress may spend for national purposes, but not for local
purposes.
The Court has deferred to Congress' determination that a pur-
pose lies within the general welfare and will not intervene "unless
the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an
exercise of judgment."30 One commentator neatly summarized the
degree of deference the Court gives Congress in making such
25. Id. at 53.
26. Id. at 64.
27. Id. at 66.
28. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; see also Butler, 297 U.S. at 65-66.
29. Butler, 297 U.S. at 67; see also Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640. In Butler, the Court
defined "particular" in the context of the taxing power. Although the Court implied that the
limitation would apply to expenditures, "[t]he bald fact stands out that in no case to date
has either the Supreme Court or any lower court held any federal grant unconstitutional as
being local rather than for general welfare." Schweppe, Congress and the "General Wel-
fare," 67 A.BA.J. 1275, 1277 (1981). In Butler, the federal government did not deposit the
collected tax into the general treasury but instead deposited the funds into the AAA fund
for distribution to farmers. The spending provisions were invalidated because Congress "re-
sortied] to the taxing power to effectuate an end which [was] not legitimate, not within the
scope of the Constitution." Butler, 297 U.S. at 69.





From Helvering and Steward Machine Co. through Buckley, the Court has
approved particular spending programs that were directly responsive to na-
tional needs that the Court found were determined by Congress to exist, and
that were designed by Congress to serve the national purposes that it had
identified as requiring remedial action.
31
The Court's definition of "general Welfare," therefore, effectively
delegates to Congress the final determination of whether an objec-
tive pursues a national interest and, hence, the general welfare."
Because the legislature may determine what expenditures will
serve the general welfare, Congress now funds activities that are
extremely local in character.33 In United States v. Gerlach Live
Stock Co. 34 the Court accepted Congress' determination that a fed-
eral expenditure to make land in California available for farming
was in the national interest, even though the plan benefitted only
California. At the time Congress made this expenditure, an ex-
isting surplus of farm land had caused farm prices to decline, mak-
ing the commission of more farm land detrimental to the nation's
well being.3 5 The Court's refusal to scrutinize general welfare de-
terminations has allowed Congress to appropriate federal funds for
local police forces, fire departments, neighborhood schools, sewer
systems, urban renewal projects, and local water projects. 6
3. The Spending Power Compared to the Other Regulatory
Powers
The spending power's utilization of two different tools-the
"necessary and proper" clause and the express power to
spend-distinguishes it from other grants of congressional power.
The spending power allows Congress to spend for the general wel-
fare. The other enumerated powers do not possess this tool but
rather rely solely on Congress' ability to enact laws under the "nec-
31. Cole, supra note 18, at 636 (emphasis in original); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91.
32. The general/particular distinction has been distorted by the lower courts. The
Eighth Circuit recently has said, "Congress's power under the spending clause is not, how-
ever, unlimited. First, in exercising that power, Congress must seek to further the well-being
of a particular region or locality." South Dakota v. Dole, 791 F.2d 628, 631 (8th Cir. 1986)
(citing Butler, 297 U.S. at 64-67 and Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640-41), aff'd, 107 U.S. 2793
(1987).
33. WORKING GROUP ON FEDERALISM OF THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, THE STATUS OF
FEDERALISM IN AMERICA 30-37 (1986).
34. 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
35. Schweppe, supra note 29, at 1276.
36. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 553 & n.15 (1985); see
also Schweppe, supra note 29, at 1276.
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essary and'proper" clause. Congress, for example, exercises the
commerce and copyright powers exclusively through its lawmaking
authority. The conceptually difficult aspect of this structure is that
the spending pdwer's general welfare phrase encompasses Con-
gress' other regulatory purposes. 7 Thus, Congress may spend to
exercise its commerce or copyright powers, not because the com-
merce and copyright powers permit these expenditures, but be-
cause the general welfare provision includes those regulatory objec-
tives.3 This distinction makes spending power analysis unique
with the bottom line being that Congress may make an expendi-
ture only in the pursuit of an objective within the general welfare.
The spending power nevertheless resembles the other regulatory
powers by allowing Congress to enact laws to effectuate spending
objectives, just as Congress passes laws to effectuate a copyright
scheme or a commerce regulating program.
B. The Power to Condition Federal Grants
The spending power carries with it the power of Congress to
fix the specific terms under which federal money allotments will be
disbursed e.3 The "necessary and proper" clause allows Congress to
pass laws in order to effectuate what is necessary and proper in the
exercise of any of its other enumerated powers.40 The Supreme
Court has concluded that the spending power, when viewed as an
independent power, allows Congress, in the pursuit of its spending
objectives, to attach conditions to the receipt of federal funds. 1
1. Types of Conditions
The current definition of condition is relatively unsophistica-
ted, referring to a simple "if-then" notion of a condition. The
courts recognize a condition on federal expenditures as any re-
quirement or circumstance that will qualify or disqualify a state
from a federal program.42 Most conditions that apply to the states
37. Cole, supra note 18, at 626.
38. Cf. id.
39. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1946).
40. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
41. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 83, 85 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting). Justice
Stone dissented in Butler stating, "It is a contradiction in terms to say that there is power
to spend for the national welfare, while rejecting any power to impose conditions reasonably
adapted to attainment of the end which alone would justify the expenditure." Id. at 85.
Justice Stone voted with the majority in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
See also Cole, supra note 18, at 635.
42. See Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM.
1166 [Vol. 40:1159
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refer either to existing and unchangeable characteristics43 or to cri-
teria that the state has the option to meet by altering its behav-
ior.44 Congress has used the spending power to make grants to a
state on the condition that the state establish a particular pro-
gram.45 The Maternity Act of 1921, for example, provided money
to a state on the condition that the recipient establish a program
designed "to reduce maternal and infant mortality and [to] protect
the health of mothers and infants." 46 If the state has the option of
altering its behavior to qualify for a federal program, Congress can
gain the state's cooperation by conditioning qualification for desir-
able federal grants on a particular condition or series of conditions.
Questions then arise over what conduct the federal govern-
ment may properly seek to manipulate through conditions and the
circumstances under which such manipulation is appropriate. More
specifically, must the condition be related to the expenditure? The
courts have not yet addressed this issue,47 but rather have gener-
ally accepted the use of spending conditions as routine congres-
sional behavior, choosing to evaluate conditional spending pro-
grams by other means.48
L. REV. 847, 871-81 (1979).
43. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1704 (1982) (declaring that conservation grants were condi-
tioned upon the requirements that individuals employed under the programs were at least
fifteen years old and permanent residents of the United States or its territories or
possessions).
44. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. III 1985) (stating that Secretary of Transportation
may withhold highway appropriations unless state raises drinking age to 21); see also infra
notes 77-79 and accompanying text. Many commentators have dedicated much attention to
distinctions between different types of conditions, attempting to distinguish between passive
and active conditions, conditions that evaluate, and conditions that require affirmative ac-
tion. These descriptions are useful to show how Congress has utilized conditions, but they
lack the clarity and certainty necessary to provide a workable analytical framework for eval-
uating spending conditions. See, e.g., Kaden, supra note 42, at 881-82; Rosenthal, Condi-
tional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1114-18 (1987).
45. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980).
46. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1922) (stating that "[the case chal-
lenges] the Act of November 23, 1921, 42 Stat. 224, c. 135, commonly called the Maternity
Act").
47. See infra notes 160-82 and accompanying text.
48. Justice Stone's dissent in Butler asserted that Congress had broad powers to con-
dition federal grants. 297 U.S. at 81 (Stone, J., dissenting). The Steward Machine Co. Court
agreed with Justice Stone's conclusion but differed with his rationale. While Justice Stone
thought conditions were limited by the objective of the expenditure, the Steward Machine
Co. Court stated that the conditioning power was even broader, limited only by the point of
coercion. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586 (1937).
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2. Origin of the Coercion/Inducement Test
In 1937 the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of
the Social Security Act in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis.49 The
Act established a national Social Security system funded by a tax
on employers with eight or more employees, but allowed employers
to deduct ninety percent of their contribution to qualified state
unemployment plans.50 Congress provided for the ninety percent
deduction in order to accommodate states that already had re-
sponded to the national need for unemployment benefits by estab-
lishing social security programs ,and to encourage other states to
establish similar programs. 1 A resident business taxpayer could
deduct its contribution to the state unemployment fund if the
state social security plan met certain requirements, including the
state's consent to deposit immediately all money it received under
the plan into the United States Treasury's Unemployment Trust
Fund.5 2 The federal government, in return, authorized an expendi-
ture to assist the state in administering its unemployment compen-
sation system.
In Steward Machine Co. the company paid the tax in accor-
dance with the federal statute and then filed a claim for refund
with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue .5 The Commissioner
denied the refund request, and the company sought relief in the
courts, asserting that the tax scheme was unconstitutional. The
company argued that Congress had invaded the reserved powers of
the State of Alabama by structuring a coercive unemployment
compensation plan that gave the state no choice but to cooperate.5
The Supreme Court agreed with the company in theory and stated
that Congress may not use the spending power to coerce a state
into participating in the federal program. 6 Coercion would make
the program the equivalent of a direct federal mandate. Because a
direct mandate would violate the tenth amendment, the same
49. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
50. Id. at 574.
51. Id. at 587-88.
52. Id. at 575 n.1.
53. The facts are not entirely clear, but it appears that Steward Machine Co. paid a
tax under Alabama's unemployment compensation act and deducted 90% of the tax from
its federal Social Security tax. The company paid $46.14 to the Internal Revenue Service.
The company hoped that without the federal statute the state would repeal its act. See id.
at 588 n.9.
54. Id. at 573.
55. Id. at 578.
56. Id. at 585-86.
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mandate effected by coercion must also violate the tenth amend-
ment. With this "coercion test," the Court demonstrated its con-
cern that Congress should be prevented from using the taxing and
spending power to "destroy[] or impair[] the autonomy of the
states. '5 7 National government coercion of the states intrudes into
the domain of the states by upsetting the separation of powers be-
tween state and national governments." Subsequent court deci-
sions have interpreted the Steward Machine Co. theory advanced
by the company and discussed by the Court to require a demarca-
tion between conditions that coerce and conditions that merely
induce.
The Court recognized the company's theory, but declined to
invalidate the Act, holding that the incentive plan did not coerce
the state.60 The state, though choosing to participate, had the op-
tion to abstain from the federal program. The state simply pre-
ferred to administer the program itself rather than allow the fed-
eral government to enter the state and administer the program.6 1
The Court agreed with dicta in its earlier decision of Massachu-
setts v. Mellon 2 to the effect that the state could avoid federal
regulation of state agencies by not succumbing to federal tempta-
tion to relinquish some of their reserved rights.63
Application of the coercion test has not yet resulted in the in-
validation of any conditions attached to a federal grant to the
states."' Under the coercion test, a court cannot invalidate a
spending scheme if the state has the option to abstain from the
federal program. Yet any conditional grant, by its very terms,
presents the state with the choice of complying or not complying
with the conditions. Thus, no conditional grant actually can coerce
57. Id. at 586; see also Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127,
142-43 (1946).
58. Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 586.
59. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 2798 (1987); Oklahoma, 330 U.S.
at 143-44.
60. Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 589.
61. Id. at 590.
62. 262 U.S. 447 (1922).
63. Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 590. In Massachusetts, the Court stated, "If
Congress enacted [the spending program] with the ulterior purpose of tempting [the states]
to yield [part of their reserved rights], that purpose may be effectively frustrated by the
simple expedient of not yielding." Massachusetts, 262 U.S. at 482.
64. See Schweppe, supra note 29, at 1277. The Court intended that Steward's holding
be rather limited. Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 590. Subsequent decisions, however,
have interpreted the decision more broadly.
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a state under the so-called coercion test.6 5
Some courts have implied that a condition would be invalid if
the potential financial loss were "catastrophic" or "coercive." 6 It
appears unlikely, however, that any court would conclude that a
purely financial threshold constitutes coercion. Any holding that a
set of spending conditions constitutes "financial duress" would be
a considerable departure from previous court opinions.8 7 Even
North Carolina ex rel. Morrow, the decision that established the
financial impact approach, found coercion not to exist when fed-
eral funding for over forty state health care programs was contin-
gent on the state establishing a separate "health planning and de-
velopment agency" to administer those programs. 8 This decision
may constitute merely an admission that the coercion test fails to
consider whether, in a practical sense, a state is being coerced by
even the most heavy-handed Congressional conditions.
The Supreme Court to date has not restrained Congress' use
of the spending power to entice state participation in federal pro-
grams. The Court has not invalidated, for any reason, any condi-
tional spending program offered to the states since Butler. Because
these spending schemes are effective and currently unimpeachable
in the courts,6 9 Congress has increased its reliance on these condi-
65. Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 143-44. The Oklahoma Court stressed that these condi-
tional spending programs impose no penalty on the state. Accord Steward Machine Co., 301
U.S. at 589-90; South Dakota v. Dole, 791 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2793
(1987); South Dakota v. Adams, 506 F. Supp. 50 (D.S.D. 1980); Texas Landowners Rights
Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mem., 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. 444 U.S. 927 (1979). In Dole the Eighth Circuit stated that, "In Oklahoma
v. Civil Service Commission ... the Supreme Court made clear that the tenth amendment
is not violated when Congress conditions the receipt of federal funds on compliance with
certain terms and conditions." 791 F.2d at 634 (citation omitted).
66. Steward, 301 U.S. at 590, cited in North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445
F. Supp. 532, 535 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
67. See, e.g., North Carolina, 445 F. Supp. at 535.
68. Id.
69. The law is only one reason among many for the states' failure in challenging these
conditional grant schemes. See Baker & Asperger, Foreword: Toward a Center for State
and Local Legal Advocacy, 31 CATH. L. REv. 367, 368 (1982). Baker and Asperger, both legal
practitioners, note that the states have been uncoordinated and ineffective in their Supreme
Court representation. In contrast, the opposition to state interests generally has been well
represented. "There is a wide-spread consensus among Court-watchers-including law
professors, veteran Supreme Court advocates, Supreme Court clerks, and even Supreme
Court Justices-that state and local governments frequently fail to represent their cases in
the most effective manner." Id.
Perhaps more importantly, the states have had little incentive to challenge these pro-
grams and risk the loss of revenue. In the few cases in which parties did question the consti-
tutionality of these programs, lack of standing usually prevented a substantive determina-
tion by the Court. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1922); Frothingham v.
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tional grants in order to implement federal policy.70
III. THE IMPACT OF CONDITIONAL GRANTS ON STATE
GOVERNMENTS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS
Congress' increased reliance on conditional grants to imple-
ment federal policy has had a correspondingly heightened impact
on state governments and the political process as a whole. The Of-
fice of Management and Budget has compiled a list of fifty-nine
policy objectives that attach to every federal grant to the states."'
These policy objectives include antidiscrimination requirements
regarding race, religion, handicaps, and gender; sixteen rules pro-
tecting the United States' cultural and physical environment; rules
concerning the use of American ships, planes, and companies in
the implementation of grant activities; employment rules; account-
ing and management rules; freedom of information rules; and
"right of privacy" rules.72 These conditions generally have little to
do with any spending program, but rather "are part of the fabric of
an overriding national policy.17 3 A state, by accepting one grant,
opens the flood gates for federal restrictions on the state's general
activities.
A. The Impact on State Policy Initiatives
Congress, through the use of conditional grants, has signifi-
cantly influenced the activities undertaken by state governments.7 4
Sometimes a state may be quite willing to yield to this influence.
In Steward Machine Co., which established the coercion test, the
state was an enthusiastic participant in the federal program, sup-
porting Congress' policy objectives and the state's role in the na-
tional plan. 5 Coercion, then, was not actually at issue in the case
that created the coercion test, though the Court chose to evaluate
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1922) (consolidated case). See generally Soloman & Benjamin, Fore-
word: Federalism-Making the Case for State and Local Governments, 18 URB. LAW. 483
(1986).
70. Cappalli, supra note 7, at 143-45.
71. Id. at 143-44.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 144.
74. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Im-
plementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1254 (1977).
75. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589 (1937). As the Court noted, the




the program in those terms.76 Lower courts did not have the oppor-
tunity to judge the coercion test until less willing participants
sought relief from the courts. Recent examples of challenges to
conditional grants indicate that, unlike Alabama in Steward Ma-
chine Co., some states are not enthusiastic about participating in
federal programs.
Some states have enacted laws that automatically revert to the
favored state policy when a condition is invalidated by a court or
not enforced by the federal government. In 1984 Congress attached
the "National Minimum Drinking Age Amendment" to the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982,77 which directs the Secre-
tary of Transportation to withhold five percent of a state's federal
highway funds if the state has not raised its minimum drinking age
to twenty-one years of age.78 If the state refuses to comply within
one year, the Secretary must withhold ten percent of the state's
federal highway funds until the state raises its minimum drinking
age to twenty-one.7 9 South Carolina reluctantly complied by rais-
ing its drinking age, but included a provision that would lower the
drinking age in the event that the condition is enjoined or declared
unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction.80 South Car-
olina's method of complying with the federal condition indicates
reluctance to participate in the federal plan.
In a similar example, Nevada enacted a law that raised the
state's maximum speed limit on its highways to seventy miles per
hour. The state, however, changed the speed limit back to fifty-five
when the Department of Transportation declared that, pursuant to
the Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act,8' the Secretary
of Transportation would eliminate the state's federal highway
76. Id. at 586.
77. 23 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. III 1985).
78. Id. § 158(a)(1).
79. Id. § 185(a)(2).
80. Section 4 of South Carolina 1985 Act No. 117 states:
[If] Public Law 98-363 [the National Minimum Drinking Age Amendment] is enjoined
by a court of competent jurisdiction or declared by a court to be contrary to the United
States Constitution, the provisions of sections 61-9-40, 61-9-455, and 20-7-370 of the
1976 Code shall be effective under the terms and conditions as existed prior to the
amendments contained in Sections 1, 2, and 3.
1985 S.C. Acts 117, § 4; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-9-40 editor's note (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1986).
81. See 23 U.S.C. § 154 (1982), as modified by 23 U.S.C.A. § 154 (Supp. 1987) (see
infra note 95 for the text of the 1987 version of the statute); 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 8011, 8019. '
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grant.8 2 These and other conditional grants have influenced the
legislative agendas of the states, which, unlike Alabama in Steward
Machine Co., generally have been displeased with the policy alter-
natives that Congress has offered.
B. The Impact on the Structure of State Governments
Congress' use of conditions also has altered the internal struc-
ture of state governments.83 Many conditions on federal grants
have required the states to create new agencies to implement the
co-sponsored social programs." In one instance, compliance with a
condition necessitated amendment of North Carolina's constitu-
tion in order to permit the establishment of a separate health de-
partment to administer certain health programs. 5 Moreover,
spending conditions can upset separation of powers within a state
government by assigning control over the federal grants to state
executive agencies. 6 Such assignments may circumvent the state's
appropriation process and deprive the legislature of control over
the state's income. These conditional programs also have dictated
the choice of persons to administer the programs. 8
Congress' use of spending conditions has disrupted the rela-
tions between some state and local governments. In Lawrence
County v. Lead-Deadwood School Districts9 the Supreme Court
invalidated a South Dakota law that required localities to dis-
tribute certain federal funds in proportion to the distribution of
local tax proceeds. South Dakota received funds under a federal
statute that compensated localities for tax revenues lost because of
federal ownership of land in the community and allowed recipients
82. NEv. REv. STAT. § 484.361 (1986) (editor's note under second version of section
with delayed effective date).
83. See generally La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergov-
ernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 779 (1982);
Note, Taking Federalism Seriously: Limiting State Acceptance of National Grants, 90
YALE L.J. 1694, 1696 (1981); Comment, Federal Interference with Checks and Balances in
State Government: A Constitutional Limit on the Spending Power, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 402
(1979).
84. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300k (1982).
85. North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd
mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978); see infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text; see also Kaden,
supra note 42, at 877.
86. See generally Comment, Federal Funds and Separation of Powers: Who Controls
the Purse?, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 611 (1984).
87. See generally id. at 612-13.
88. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 144-45 (1946).
89. 469 U.S. 256 (1985).
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to use the payment "for any governmental purpose." 90 The Court
held that the directives of the federal statute preempted state law
and that the locality could use the money for whatever purpose it
desired.9
C. Consequences of Forfeiture
1. Disruption in Planning and Loss of Investment Resulting
from State Reliance on Federal Programs
The pressure on states to cooperate with grant conditions is
even more apparent when Congress attaches conditions to existing
federal benefits.92 Having accepted the federal benefit with the
original set of limited conditions, a state often comes to rely on the
presence of the benefit. The state may have restructured its ser-
vices and budget to accommodate the program and the original
conditions93 or may have planned future projects and expansion
around the federal incentives. 4 Because of the state's reliance on
the program, rejecting the federal grant would place the state in a
worse position than before Congress imposed the new condition.
The National Highway Safety Act95 is a telling example of this
90. Id. at 259 n.4.
91. Id. at 270 (stating that "Congress intended the affected units of local government
• ..to be the managers of these funds, not merely the State's cashiers"). A spending direc-
tive that allows a local unit of government to spend the federal grant for any purpose the
locality wishes may be contrary to the general welfare clause of the Constitution. An expen-
diture to a local government with no direction cannot pursue an objective for the general
welfare. See generally Cole, supra note 18; see also Schweppe, supra note 29, at 1276-77.
92. For an example of a condition attached to an existing benefit, see 23 U.S.C. § 154
(1982), as modified by 23 U.S.C.A. § 154 (Supp. 1987) (establishing the 55 m.p.h. speed
limit). See also infra note 95 for the text of the 1987 version of the statute.
93. Kaden, supra note 42, at 882.
94. For example, when planning its highway programs, the State of Illinois Depart-
ment of Transportation projects the amount of grants that it will receive from the federal
government. Illinois expects to receive $504 million in fiscal year (FY) 1987, which begins
July 1, 1987, $489 million in FY 1988, $461 million in FY 1989, $450 million in FY 1990,
$450 million in FY 1991, and $450 million in FY 1992. Letter from Randy Vereen, Illinois
Department of Transportation, to Author (May 20, 1987) (on file with Author).
95. 23 U.S.C. § 154 (1982), as modified by 23 U.S.C.A. § 154 (Supp. 1987). Congress
recently repealed the 55 m.p.h. maximum speed limit, but may reenact this restriction. In
addition, Congress has only repealed the restriction on interstate highways, replacing it with
a 65 m.p.h. maximum speed limit; all other highways still have a federally imposed 55 m.p.h.
maximum speed limit. The new statute states:
§ 154. National maximum speed limit
(a) The Secretary of Transportation shall not approve any project under section
106 in any State which has (1) a maximum speed limit on any public highway within
its jurisdiction in excess of fifty-five miles per hour other than a highway on the Inter-
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dilemma. Enacted in 1978, this act conditions the receipt of federal
highway funds on a state's reduction of its maximum speed limit to
fifty-five miles per hour on all highways. Suppose, hypothetically,
that in 1976 a state chose to undertake a major highway rebuilding
program, but could not afford to proceed with the project without
federal financial assistance. Congress had determined that provid-
ing funds to the states would encourage them to maintain and re-
build their highways, which would further an interest within the
general welfare. Because of the federal incentive, the state added
its own funds to the available federal money and, as Congress had
hoped, embarked on a ten-year plan to renovate its entire highway
system. Two years into the rebuilding plan, the new condition be-
came effective, forcing the state to comply with the new condition
in order to receive federal assistance during the plan's final years.
The federal government had initially encouraged the state to re-
build roads with the federal aid, and now, presented with the new
condition, the state must choose between complying with the con-
dition or abandoning or altering its plan for major infrastructure
improvements. Congress has the power to enact a national speed
limit based on its commerce powers, but initial participation in a
federal program can limit a state's ability to decline offers from the
federal government.96 The state still has the option to decline the
benefit and escape federal manipulation, but exercising that option
becomes quite costly.
9 7
The states often match federal funds with funds from the
state System located outside of an urbanized area of 50,000 population or more, (2) a
maximum speed limit on any highway within its jurisdiction on the Interstate System
located outside of an urbanized area of 50,000 population or more in excess of 65 miles
per hour, or (3) a speed limit on any other portion of a public highway within its juris-
diction which is not uniformly applicable to all types of motor vehicles using such por-
tion of highway, if on November 1, 1973, such portion of highway had a speed limit
which was uniformly applicable to all types of motor vehicles using it. A lower speed
limit may be established for any vehicle operating under a special permit because of
any weight or dimension of such vehicle, including any loan thereon. Clause (3) of this
subsection shall not apply to any portion of a highway during such time that the condi-
tion of the highway, weather, an accident, or other condition creates a temporary haz-
ard to the safety of traffic on such portion of a highway.
23 U.S.C.A. § 154 (Supp. 1987). This modification illustrates the breadth of the regulation.
If the state raises the speed limit to 65 m.p.h. on a state highway, the state risks losing
funding of all of its federally subsidized highway projects.
96. See Rosenthal, supra note 44, at 1134-35.
97. See Leach v. Carlisle, 258 U.S. 138, 141 (1922) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (comment-
ing that "when habit and law combine to exclude every other [option] it seems to me that
the First Amendment in terms forbids such control").
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state treasury as a condition to federal grants.98 A state would lose
the public funds it had already invested if Congress encouraged
the state into a venture and then attempted to extort new conces-
sions after the state had structured and planned around the initial
federal program." Some commentators have suggested that the
courts should be sensitive to the possibility that the retraction of a
current benefit may have an unconstitutional impact.10 The
threatened withdrawal of a federal benefit has essentially the same
ability as a financial incentive to influence the states' behavior.
2. Breadth of Grants Attached to a Single Condition
In addition to placing new conditions on existing programs,
Congress has pressured the states by broadening the base of fed-
eral benefits to which Congress attached a particular condition.10'
For example, the National Health Planning and Resources Devel-
opment Act of 1974102 required the states to establish a "Health
Planning and Development Agency," which would assume various
regulatory and certification functions, in order to qualify for fed-
eral funding.10 3 A state that failed to comply with the new regula-
98. Madden, Terms and Conditions of Federal Grants, 18 URB. LAW. 551, 553-54, 565-
66 (1986).
99. Kaden, supra note 42, at 882 (stating that "[i]f this aid proves temporary, its with-
drawal creates added pressures on subnational governments that have accommodated their
service plans to the new source of revenue"); Lamm, The Fiscal Squeeze on Local Govern-
ment, 13 CURRENT MUN. PROBS. 17, 19 (1986) (noting that "the federal government is with-
drawing its financial support for a number of local activities and facilities. These activities,
never sought out by local units of government in the first place, are very difficult to abandon
once started and institutionalized").
100. See, e.g., Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1362 (1984). Professor Kreimer stated:
So, too, a citizen may reasonably come to rely on past practice and justifiably regard a
change as a deprivation, different in kind from a mere failure to provide a benefit. Once
the government decides upon a course of action, it should be held to account for the
impact of its decision on constitutional rights.
Id.
101. Rosenthal, supra note 44, at 1134 (noting that "recent Congresses have contrived
[Draconian sanctions] to inflict on states that refuse to abide by the conditions imposed").
This wider applicability of particular conditions creates the impression, in some cases, that
Congress thinks of the condition first and then finds a series of spending programs to which
it can attach the condition. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (loss of federal post office sub-
sidy for failure to hire handicapped individuals); 31 U.S.C. § 1241(a)(1) (1982) (prohibiting
recipient of federal grants from discriminating in hiring on basis of religion); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(d) (1982) (prohibiting any institution receiving federal funds from denying benefits
or discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin). See generally R. ROTUNDA, J.
NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 4, § 5.7(b) (1986).
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300u (1982).
103. North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532, 533 (E.D.N.C. 1977),
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tions would forfeit federal support for an array of health programs.
North Carolina did not wish to comply with the new conditions,
but the possibility of losing aid to over forty financial assistance
health programs forced the state to amend its constitution in order
to comply with the conditions.1
0 4
In some instances, one state agency's failure to comply with a
federal condition results in the loss of a similar benefit in a sepa-
rate innocent agency. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act of 1974,105 for example, provided for the termination of an
educational institution's federal funding if the institution did not
give parents access to their children's school records. This termina-
tion would apply to all separately funded divisions of an educa-
tional institution even if only one of the divisions did not comply
with the disclosure requirements and the noncomplying division
did not receive any federal funding. 06 Thus, failure to adopt a sin-
gle condition could start a chain reaction of federal grant forfeit-
ures between unrelated and independent state and private
entities.1
0 7
aff'd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
104. See North Carolina, 445 F. Supp. at 535; see also In re Certificate of Need for
Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973). The circumstances in the
North Carolina case were unusual in that the state constitution prevented the state from
complying with the consolidation required by the Act. North Carolina could qualify only by
passing an amendment to its constitution allowing it to establish such an agency. Failure to
establish the agency potentially would cost North Carolina federal aid for forty-two federal
health assistance programs. The court nevertheless held that the conditions were valid:
We perceive nothing unconstitutional either in the purposes of the Act or in the condi-
tion thereby attached to health grants made to the States under federal health pro-
grams. Without question Congress in making grants for health care to the States,
should be vitally concerned with the efficient use of the funds it appropriates for that
purpose. It had a perfect right to see that such funds did not cause unnecessary infla-
tion in health costs to the individual patient. It certainly had the power to attach to its
grants conditions designed to accomplish that end.
North Carolina, 445 F. Supp. at 534. The special circumstances in North Carolina that
caused the unusual impact of the federal condition were irrelevant to the evaluation of the
program's constitutionality. "Were this not so," the court stated, "any State, dissatisfied
with some valid federal condition on a federal grant could thwart the congressional purpose
by the expedient of amending its Constitution or by securing a decision of its own Supreme
Court." Id. at 535. Therefore, the fact that a condition may force the state to pass a law
would not invalidate a condition, though a requirement that a state enact legislation may be
invalid. See infra note 204.
105. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1982).
106. Comment, supra note 20, at 295.
107. See, e.g., Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025, 1026-28




3. Political Consequences of Forfeiture
A state that abstains from a federal program risks adverse po-
litical consequences. The funds that Congress offers the states are
essentially a return of tax dollars collected from the state's resi-
dents. Allocation formulas for federal programs often parallel pop-
ulation and contribution, ' s and the funds often go toward such
local services as police and fire protection, education, public health
and hospitals, parks and recreation, and sanitation. 0 9 If the state
chooses to exercise its option to abstain, then its residents are
forced to pay twice for the provision of ordinary municipal ser-
vices. 10 The perception that the state's residents have a proprie-
tary interest in the funds makes rejection of the federal benefit
extremely difficult.
Congress' use of conditional grants to the states also diffuses
the electorate's efforts to hold elected officials accountable for their
political decisions."' For example, rather than having the federal
government directly administer a program, Congress sometimes of-
fers the states a handsome reward for implementing program
under federal guidelines. These incentives can be extremely effec-
tive because they diffuse potential voter retribution. The federal
government shifts the ultimate decision to the states, which can
claim that there was no option but to do as Congress requested in
order to avoid forfeiture of badly needed federal funds. Thus, local
voters have difficulty identifying the responsible governmental
108. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5306 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (detailing allocation formula
for community development grants).
109. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 553 (1985); see also
Schweppe, supra note 29, at 1276.
110. See Williams, Liberty & Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 3, 24 (1983); cf. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589 (1937). In
defending the tax credit provisions of the Social Security Act, the Steward Machine Co.
Court said that states with their own Social Security program should get a tax break. Other-
wise the states would be forced to pay twice for the program. Id.
Because the courts have allowed Congress to spend federal money for local projects, the
federal government taxes community residents with the intention of returning the funds in
the form of local projects. One commentator expressed the states' predicament this way:
The Court in Steward Machine Co. stressed that the states had welcomed the estab-
lishment of the federal program. Realistically, however, they had no choice but to go
along with it, since the alternative would have made their citizens pay the entire fed-
eral tax but with no reassurance that they would receive an unemployment insurance
program in return.
Rosenthal, supra note 44, at 1127; see also Schweppe, supra note 29, at 1276-77.





D. The Cumulative Impact of Conditions
Congress' manipulation of conditions attached to federal
grants has compromised the states' ability to control their gov-
erning structure and policy agenda. The states' ability to avoid the
federal conditions is limited because the states have structured
their governments and policies around the federal programs. From
the states' perspective, each federal condition appears innocuous
when compared to the consequences of noncompliance. Although
apparently harmless, the cumulative impact of such conditions has
caused some states to give priority to complying with federal con-
ditions over the pursuit of state initiatives. The Supreme Court
noted in Garcia that in the past twenty-five years federal grants to
states and localities have grown from seven billion dollars to
ninety-six billion dollars, accounting for about one-fifth of state
and local government expenditures.113 Congress' increased reliance
on conditions to implement federal policy has reduced proportion-
ately the amount of time, effort, and money the state can devote to
state initiatives. With Congress having unlimited taxing power, the
courts should be careful to determine whether the Constitution al-
lows Congress to influence the whole gamut of state activities
through conditional federal grants. Although their identical im-
pacts on state behavior indicate that conditions on federal grants
are essentially the same as direct federal regulations, the Court has
analyzed the two restrictions quite differently.
IV. THE INADEQUACIES OF THE COERCION/INDUCEMENT TEST
A. Identifying Coercion
Subsequent cases have cited Steward Machine Co. as the ori-
gin of the coercion test"" and assumed that the test can identify
unconstitutional exercises of the spending power. The Steward
Machine Co. Court itself, however, recognized the difficulty of de-
termining whether a statutory scheme coerces a state. The Court
112. Stewart, supra note 74, at 1255. Professor Stewart objected to conditions similar
to the 55 m.p.h. speed limit because "[sluch a condition, accompanying funds which the
state cannot afford to forgo, intensifies federal interference with local mechanisms of politi-
cal accountability by compelling states to enforce against their constituencies restrictions
that the constituencies oppose." Id.
113. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552-53.
114. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980).
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questioned whether the concept of coercion can ever be applied
validly to the relations between a state and nation. 115 One com-
mentator expressed the difficulties of this analysis and concluded
that debating whether conditions on federal grants in these cir-
cumstances "coerce" the states is a futile pursuit: "The question
is not whether federal requirements overbear on a hyposta-
tized state 'free will,' but whether they unduly compromise norma-
tive political conception of state autonomy. 11 6 In short, a state's
decisionmaking process is not readily characterized in terms of co-
ercion or inducement.
1 7
Theoretical problems accompany the practical difficulties of
applying the coercion test. According to current spending power
analysis, Congress can remain within the limits of the spending
power simply by conditioning the receipt of federal grants on the
state's compliance with federal mandates. A condition on a spend-
ing grant cannot actually coerce a state, which always has the op-
portunity to decline the benefit and avoid the accompanying fed-
eral regulation." 8 The courts have rejected the coercion test in
other areas of constitutional adjudication because the withholding
of a benefit that merely induces nevertheless allows a government
to penalize indirectly behavior that the government cannot penal-
ize directly.
B. Distinguishing Coercive From Inducive Grant Schemes
If the state does not comply with a federal grant condition, the
state violates no law; the federal government simply withholds the
connected grant." 9 The coercion test attempts to distinguish be-
tween circumstances in which the withholding of a benefit coerces
from circumstances in which the withholding of a benefit merely
induces. The test operates on the principle that the Constitution
permits a withholding scheme that induces but forbids one that
coerces.
The courts have discarded this coercion/inducement dichot-
omy in other areas of constitutional adjudication because no dis-
tinction exists in practical terms between withholding a benefit
115. Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 590.
116. Stewart, supra note 74, at 1254; see also Kreimer, supra note 100, at 1391 (stat-
ing that "[i]f federalism dictates that certain decisions be withheld from the federal govern-
ment and entrusted to the states, a state waiver should be irrelevant").
117. Note, supra note 83, at 1698. But cf. Rosenthal, supra note 44, at 1140-42.
118. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
119. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947).
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and assessing a penalty.12° Distinguishing a withholding scheme
that induces from one that coerces is the equivalent of distinguish-
ing a penalty that provides a strong deterrent from one that pro-
vides a weak deterrent.12 1 The courts generally do not evaluate
penalties by their force but rather by examining the conduct that
results in a penalty.12 2 Therefore, the courts have chosen to evalu-
ate certain conditional spending schemes not by their effectiveness
in altering behavior, but by the conduct that disqualifies a party
from a benefit.
The Supreme Court has held that a condition which inhibits
the exercise of constitutionally protected behavior is the equivalent
of penalizing the exercise of constitutionally protected behavior. In
Sherbert v. Verner12 3 the Court invalidated a South Carolina stat-
ute that disqualified a person from receiving unemployment bene-
fits if he or she failed to accept work without good cause. 24 Mrs.
Sherbert, because of her religious beliefs, refused to accept a job
that required her to work on Saturdays. 25 The Court stated that
governmental imposition of such a choice places the same kind of
burden upon free exercise of religion as a fine imposed for Satur-
day worship.126 The Court also stated that the resemblance be-
tween fines or penalties and conditions on benefits has led the
courts to analyze both in the same manner.
127
Courts that equate the withholding of a benefit with a penalty
are not interested in whether the government is withholding a ma-
jor benefit or a minor one. In Sherbert, for example, the Court
stated that the condition placed a "burden" on Mrs. Sherbert's re-
ligious practices 28 and concluded that the condition was invalid if
it imposed "any burden on the free exercise of appellant's reli-
gion."' 29 A court's analysis of a state law that assessed a one dollar
fine for going to a particular church would be the same as the anal-
120. See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
122. But see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
123. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
124. Id. at 400 n.3.
125. Id. at 403.
126. Id. at 404. The Court further stated: "[T]o condition the availability of benefits
upon this appellants willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effec-
tively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties." Id. at 406.
127. Id. at 404 & n.6, 405.
128. Id. at 404.
129. Id. at 403 (emphasis added). The state can overcome the presumption of invalid-
ity by showing, as required by standard first amendment analysis, a compelling state inter-
est for the restriction.
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ysis of a law that assessed a one hundred dollar fine. In this con-
text, a court does not distinguish inducement in the form of a con-
dition attached to an insignificant benefit from coercion in the
form of a condition attached to a necessary benefit.13 0 The condi-
tion is either valid or invalid under both schemes.
C. Coercion Test Allows Circumvention of Existing Regulatory
Restrictions
Because conditional grant programs regulate behavior indi-
rectly,131 the courts have struggled with the possibility that such
programs might avoid the scrutiny of direct regulation. In Federal
Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters3 2 the
Supreme Court invalidated a 1981 amendment to the Public
Broadcasting Act of 1967. The 1967 Act established a nonprofit
corporation that distributed federal funds to noncommercial radio
and television stations.1 33 The 1981 amendment disqualified from
federal funding any station that "engage[d] in editorializing.' 3 4
The majority opinion did not evaluate the restriction as a condi-
tion on a federal expenditure, but rather applied the same analysis
that the Court would apply to direct regulation. The Court ignored
the coercion test and invalidated the condition simply because it
abridged the freedom of the press in violation of the first amend-
ment of the Constitution.
1 3 5
Justice Rehnquist's dissent, on the other hand, did analyze the
amendment as a spending condition,136 noting that the owners of
the noncommercial broadcasting stations knew of the conditions
when they accepted the grants. Justice Rehnquist concluded that
the condition was valid because it served the objective of the ex-
penditure.1 37 Although both the dissent and the majority addressed
the first amendment concerns, the traditional coercion analysis
130. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding that
a state cannot condition a state job on reduced due process protection); Thomas v. Review
Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that a state cannot
condition unemployment benefits on compromising personal religious practices); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638-41 (1969) (noting that Congress may not induce the states to
impose conditions on recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children).
131. See supra notes 71-113 and accompanying text.
132. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
133. Id. at 366.
134. 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1982).
135. 468 U.S. at 398.
136. Id. at 402 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 408.
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would have ignored first amendment implications of a conditional
grant program like the 1981 Amendment. Steward Machine Co.
held that any condition attached to a federal grant to a state is
permitted because the state can always decline the benefit, escape
the condition, and preserve whatever state sovereignty the Court
believes that the tenth amendment protects. If League of Women
Voters had followed Steward Machine Co., the Court would have
held that the stations simply could decline the federal benefit, es-
cape the "no editorializing" requirement, and continue to broad-
cast whatever they wanted."3 8
A comparison of Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in League
of Women Voters with his majority opinion in South Dakota v.
Dole further illustrates the Court's confusion over the role of the
coercion test in spending clause analysis. In the earlier of the two
cases, League of Women Voters, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist
stated that Congress had a legitimate purpose in placing conditions
on grants to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting." 9 Likewise,
in Dole Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that Congress also had a
valid purpose in attaching conditions to highway grants.140 Because
both the stations and the states had the power to reject the grants,
the content of the conditions was of little concern.14 1 What was
perhaps a remarkably consistent approach for Justice Rehnquist,
however, was a complete turnabout for the Court.1 42 Justices Mar-
138. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), overruled by Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
139. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 407 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
140. South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 2797 (1987).
141. Justice Rehnquist covered his tracks in League of Women Voters by claiming
that the restrictions were neutral in content and therefore did not violate the first amend-
ment. His analysis does not depend greatly on discussion of the content of conditions. Dis-
playing his lack of concern for the substance of these amendments, the Justice summarized
his dissent by stating:
Perhaps a more appropriate analogy than that of Little Red Riding Hood and the Big
Bad Wolf is that of Faust and Mephistopheles; Pacifica, well aware of § 399's condition
on the receipt of public money, nonetheless accepted the public money and now seeks
to avoid the conditions which Congress legitimately has attached to receipt of that
funding.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 403 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
In Dole Chief Justice Rehnquist appeared to be even more nonchalant towards the im-
pact of the conditions on the states that he concluded his majority opinion by declaring:
"Even if Congress might lack the power to impose a national minimum drinking age di-
rectly, we conclude that encouragement to state action found in § 158 is a valid use of the
spending power." Dole, 107 S. Ct. at 2799.
142. Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in League of Women Voters,
did not agree with Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Dole and wrote a short
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shall, Powell, and Blackmun joined in Dole with the same reason-
ing that they earlier had rejected in League of Women Voters.
14
3
The impression that emerges from the Justices' ambivalence is
that the Court will either agree or disagree with the contested con-
dition depending on the individual Justices' subjective inclinations.
With that, the analysis has plunged into a Lochnerian abyss with
the coercion test being selectively reintroduced when the Court
wishes to uphold the condition or forgotten when the Court wishes
to strike it down.
The Supreme Court has avoided distinguishing between coerc-
ing and inducing schemes when evaluating federal conditions on
nongrant benefits to the states. In Coyle v. Smith'4 4 the Court held
that Congress could not condition Oklahoma's admission to the
United States on the location of its capital.145 The Court could
have applied the coercion test and held that the condition was
valid because Oklahoma had the option to reject Congress' offer for
statehood.' 4  Instead, the Court stated that to allow this condition-
ing would permit Congress to enlarge its powers by the conditions
imposed upon new states by Congress' own legislation admitting
new states into the Union.147 The Court here foresaw the dilemma
created by conditional benefits: the imposition of conditions could
allow Congress to frustrate the Constitution's allocation of
powers.1
48
The Court in Sherbert, Coyle, and League of Women Voters
separate dissent, stating that Congress has no power to condition a federal grant in a man-
ner that abridges the states' twenty-first amendment right to regulate the minimum age for
purchasing liquor. See id. at 2799 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
143. Compare Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793 with League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364.
144. 221 U.S. 559 (1910).
145. Id. at 564-65.
146. Cf. id. at 565-66 (stating that "Congress may, in the exercise of such power, im-
pose terms and conditions upon the admission of the proposed new state, which, if accepted,
will be obligatory, although they operate to deprive the state of powers which it would oth-
erwise possess").
147. Id. at 567.
148. See also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 72 (1936). For another example of
the Court's refusal to allow Congress to condition nonfinancial federal benefits on relin-
quishing rights, see United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (invalidating portions of
Federal Kidnapping Act because it presents suspects with choice between waiving right to
jury trial in exchange for no death penalty upon conviction).
Congress' unlimited taxing power further exacerbates Congress' ability to circumvent
the constitutional restrictions on its power. Congress can continue to increase taxes to raise
the funds necessary to "buy" the states' independence. See Easterbrook, Insider Trading,
Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SuP. CT.
REV. 309, 347; Kreimer, supra note 100, at 1391-93.
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has stated implicitly that Congress and the states should not be
able to use government benefits as a means of circumventing con-
stitutional restrictions on the exercise of their regulatory powers.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, apparently disagrees. In Dole
the Chief Justice stated that limitations on Congress' spending
power are "less exacting than those on its authority to regulate di-
rectly"14 and do not prohibit "indirect achievement of objectives
which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly. '150 Restric-
tions on Congress' power arguably should not be less restrictive
when Congress uses its spending power. Admittedly, the spending
power authorizes conditions that may not have any support inde-
pendent of the spending power. 151 The courts, however, should not
ignore the applicability of constitutional restrictions on congres-
sional power whenever Congress' authority to impose conditions is
at issue. As the Chief Justice's analysis admits, application of the
coercion test allows Congress to evade restrictions on its powers.
V. DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF GRANT CONDITIONS
After abandoning the coercion test in spending power cases,
the Court next must construct an analysis that focuses on the sub-
stance of the condition. In cases such as Sherbert and League of
Women Voters in which the Court ignored the coercion test, the
conditions were analyzed in the same manner as regulations. The
Court viewed the conditions as restrictions on first amendment in-
terests and simply applied a traditional first amendment analy-
sis,152 inquiring into whether the conditions at issue placed a bur-
den on the respective first amendment interests and then whether
the government had a compelling interest for restricting the activ-
ity. With some refinement, such an analysis could be equally well
suited for cases involving federal grants to the states.
Coyle, Sherbert, and League of Women Voters demonstrate
that conditions, as currently treated by the Court, are merely sim-
ple regulations attached to benefits. The Court has abandoned the
condition analysis when more appears to be at stake than a federal
benefit. 53 In the context of individuals, the first eight amendments
provide an analytical alternative to the coercion test. In the con-
text of the states, however, the prevention of encroachment
149. South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 2797 (1987).
150. Id. at 2797, 2798.
151. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
152. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 374-75.
153. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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originates in the governmental structure intended to limit the fed-
eral government to its delegated powers.5 Thus, an analysis that
distinguishes precisely between permissible and impermissible con-
gressional action is extremely important.
155
When assessing the validity of conditions on federal grants to
the states, the Court arguably should adopt a test that more
closely parallels the lawmaking mechanism described in the Con-
stitution. 56 Instead of using the coercion test, the Court might de-
termine whether an enumerated power of Congress supports a par-
ticular condition. The spending power supports some conditions on
federal grants to the states if the condition is necessary to imple-
ment the objective of Congress' expenditure. 5 An unnecessary
condition may still be valid if the Constitution allows Congress to
enact the condition, unconnected to the expenditure, as a law sup-
ported by another regulatory power.158 The courts have enunciated
this analysis in dicta, but no court has consciously applied a like
analysis that traces the lawmaking mechanism.'59
A. Determining What Conditions the Spending Power
Authorizes
Most courts have not scrutinized the content of conditions
placed on federal grants to the states. 60 The courts that have com-
mented on the content of conditions have concluded simply that
154. See Rosenthal, supra note 44, at 1126 n.105.
155. Id.
156. The tenth amendment traditionally was the primary restraint on Congress' abil-
ity to regulate the states. In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Court, how-
ever, rejected the view that the tenth amendment itself represented an exclusive reservation
of power for the states. The Court instead insisted that the tenth amendment represented
an observation. By stating that the tenth amendment was only a "truism," the Court re-
moved any limitation generated by the tenth amendment itself that would restrict Congress'
ability to regulate what had been established previously as exclusive state regulatory terri-
tory. Id. at 124. Although the Court retreated from this interpretation of the tenth amend-
ment in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1975), the Court reinstated
Darby's passive interpretation in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
469 U.S. 528 (1985). The Darby court's analysis presumes that Congress will exercise only
its delegated powers. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
157. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 85-86 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting); see also
Comment, supra note 20, at 300-01, 305.
158. Stewart, supra note 74, at 1257-61.
159. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819) (stating that "[t]he
only security against the abuse of [the taxing] power, is found in the structure of the gov-
ernment itself"). Justice O'Connor advocated an approach in her Dole dissent that attempts
this same goal. See 107 S. Ct. at 2799 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
160. See infra note 182.
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the Constitution authorizes any condition that pursues a national
interest." 1 This result reveals that many grant conditions may not
constitute spending conditions at all. The spending power does not
authorize conditions, only expenditures, that pursue the "general
Welfare. 16 2 To implement the general welfare objective of an ex-
penditure, Congress may find it necessary to attach conditions to
the expenditure. The necessary and proper gloss on the spending
power authorizes only those conditions necessary to implement the
objectives of the expenditure.10 3
1. Current Confusion Over the Scope of Permissible Conditions
Much of the confusion over permissible conditions dates back
to language in Steward Machine Co. in which the Court stated
that the conditions included in the federal unemployment program
were not unrelated to a "legitimately national" objective. 1 6  The
Court was not endorsing the notion that the Constitution permits
all spending conditions related to any national objectives.'65 Some
lower courts, however, have stated that a condition on a federal
grant is valid if reasonably related to a "legitimately national" con-
cern. "'66 In Vermont v. Brinegar,16 7 for example, a federal district
court responded to Vermont's challenge of the federal Highway
Beautification Act of 1965.168 The Act required the states to re-
move billboards along public highways or accept a ten percent re-
duction in the state's share of federal highway appropriations.1 6 9
The Act directed the states to compensate the owners of the pro-
hibited billboards 70 for which the states would be reimbursed sev-
enty-five percent of the sign owner's compensation.' 7 ' The ques-
tion before the court was whether the combination of conditions
contained in the federal legislation violated the tenth amend-
ment.172 The district court, citing Steward Machine Co., wrote that
161. See id.
162. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
163. See id.
164. Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 591.
165. Id. at 590.
166. See, e.g., Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606, 616 (D. Vt. 1974). Although the
courts generally have not cited Brinegar for this test, Brinegar's language tends to appear in
many lower court opinions. See Note, supra note 83, at 1697 n.25.
167. 379 F. Supp. 606 (D. Vt. 1974).
168. 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1982).
169. 23 U.S.C. § 131(b) (1982).
170. 23 U.S.C. § 131(g) (1982).
171. Id.
172. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. at 615.
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the applicable issues were, first, whether the measure under attack
coerced the state and, second, whether the legislation was reasona-
bly related to a legitimate national end.
173
By posing the second question, the district court erroneously
added another requirement to the already derailed spending condi-
tion analysis. According to Brinegar, both the expenditure and the
condition must pursue objectives within the general welfare. This
analysis reveals a fatal misunderstanding of Steward Machine Co.
Under Brinegar's articulation of the test, the condition takes on a
life of its own, quite apart from that of the expenditure, in its sep-
arate pursuit of the general welfare. Thus, Brinegar states that the
national objectives pursued by the expenditure and the condition
do not have to be the same.17 4 In effect, Congress is conditioning
for the general welfare, an action the Constitution clearly prohib-
its. 17 5 Congress has the power to condition only because it has the
power to spend. Congress' power to spend for the general welfare,
173. Id. at 616, citing Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 591. The Brinegar court re-
solved the coercion prong of the test with the reasoning of Massachusetts that "[i]f Con-
gress enacted [the statute] with the ulterior purpose of tempting [the states] to yield, that
purpose may be effectively frustrated by the simple expedient of not yielding." Massachu-
setts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1922); see Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. at 617.
174. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. at 616.
175. The Constitution clearly prohibits this result. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238 (1936), the Court stated: "[The Constitution] made no grant of authority to Con-
gress to legislate substantively for the general welfare, . . . and no such authority exists,
save as the general welfare may be promoted by the exercise of the powers which are
granted [in the Constitution]." Id. at 292. The framers noted that such an interpretation of
the general welfare provision was incorrect because if the Congress can attach conditions on
grants whenever the conditions pursue the general welfare, then the other enumerated pow-
ers would have been unnecessary. Cole, supra note 18, at 624-27.
Parties that have supported laws that might not have found support in any of Congress'
enumerated powers have argued that a problem that is national in scope and that the states
cannot handle adequately must fall within the scope of Congress's power. The Carter court
faced a similar argument and replied:
[N]othing is more certain than that beneficent aims, however great or well directed,
can never serve in lieu of constitutional power.
The proposition ... that the power of the federal government inherently extends
to purposes affecting the Nation as a whole with which the states severally cannot deal
or cannot adequately deal, and the related notion that Congress, entirely apart from
those powers delegated by the Constitution, may enact laws to promote the general
welfare, have never been accepted but always definitely rejected by this court.
Carter, 298 U.S. at 291; Cole, supra note 18, at 633. Only Congress' power to enact laws, not
the quality of its laws, concern the Constitution. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644-45
(1937) (stating that "[the Court's] concern. . . is with power, not with wisdom"); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) (per curiarn). Although Carter's commerce clause interpretation
has been overruled in subsequent cases, the Court's statements regarding the Constitution's
limitation of Congress to its delegated powers have not been criticized.
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though accompanied by the ability to place related conditions,
surely does not allow the legislature to impose conditions that pur-
sue separate, unrelated national objectives. By upholding general
welfare conditions, the courts appear to have adopted the interpre-
tation of the general welfare clause that was advanced by those
who sought to discredit the Constitution.77 Thus, the dual focus
on the objectives of both the condition and the expenditure is
based on a misguided interpretation of the "general Welfare"
clause of the Constitution.
2. Reevaluating Steward Machine Co.
In attempting to define what conditions the spending power
authorizes, the Steward Machine Co. Court may not have intended
to establish the coercion test as the standard of constitutionality.
The Court acknowledged that "what is basic and essential may be
assured by suitable conditions ' 17 7 and expressly stated that its de-
cision did not address the validity of a condition requiring the
state to adopt a "statute unrelated in subject matter to activities
fairly within the scope of national policy or power. 1 78 The propri-
ety of requiring the state to adopt an acceptable Social Security
Program before allowing a taxpayer to deduct paid state unem-
ployment taxes was not at issue because the condition clearly re-
lated to the federal tax objective.1 7 9 Questions regarding the rela-
176. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. Even the Supreme Court has
tripped on this language at times. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), the
Court upheld the new public campaign financing statute and stated: "In this case, Congress
was legislating for the 'general Welfare'-to reduce the deleterious influence of large contri-
butions on our political process, to facilitate communication by candidates with the electo-
rate, and to free candidates from the rigors of fundraising." Id. at 91. It is well established
that Congress cannot legislate for the general welfare. See supra note 21 and accompanying
text.
The Court recognized that Congress' power to condition grants concerned the necessary
and proper clause. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91. The Court's understanding of the clause, how-
ever, permitted the conditions because, "Congress has concluded that the means are 'neces-
sary and proper' to promote the general welfare," and therefore the conditions are valid. Id.
The Court actually meant that the expenditure was for an objective well within the scope of
the general welfare and that the conditions related to Congress' purpose for making the
expenditure. Because the conditions were necessary to implement the objective of the ex-
penditure, the conditions constituted valid conditions supported by the necessary and
proper gloss on the spending power.
177. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593 (1937).
178. Id. at 590.
179. Id. at 593. The Court stated: "A credit to taxpayers for payments made to a State
under a state unemployment law will be manifestly futile in the absence of some assurance
that the law leading to the credit is in truth what it professes to be." Id.
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tionship of the condition to the tax were to be determined at
another time. The Steward Machine Co. Court did not intend "na-
tional policy and power" or "legitimately national" ends to be self-
defining. Instead, the scope of national power and policy should be
defined by the congressional action permissible under Congress'
regulatory powers, subject to all constitutional limitations on the
powers of the legislative branch.
3. Permissible Spending Power Conditions
The Supreme Court in Steward Machine Co. implied that the
power to make an expenditure for a specific purpose would justify
"suitable conditions" that are "basic and essential" to the expendi-
ture. s0 While the Constitution does not expressly allow Congress
to attach conditions to federal grants, the necessary and proper
clause does permit Congress to enact the "laws" that are necessary
to implement objectives pursued through Congress' enumerated
powers."' For example, a law may intend to assist in the regula-
tion of interstate commerce. When exercising its spending power,
Congress has the power to attach conditions only to the extent
necessary to effectuate spending objectives. The power to attach
conditions is a supplemental power to each separate congressional
exercise of the spending power. Thus, the combined force of the
spending and necessary and proper clauses allows Congress to at-
tach conditions that assist in pursuing the objectives of the expen-
diture, and not of objectives unrelated to that expenditure.182
180. Id.
181. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
182. The Court purports to apply this relatedness requirement in spending cases. See
South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 2797 (1987). Justice O'Connor, however, sensed inad-
equacy in the Court's current relatedness analysis, causing her to dissent in Dole. Justice
O'Connor argued that "the Court's application of the requirement that the condition im-
posed be reasonably related to the purpose for which the funds are expended, is cursory and
unconvincing." Id. at 2799 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She then proceeded to outline the
proper method of delineating conditions supported by the spending power and regulations
which must be supported by another of Congress' powers in order to be valid. Id. at 2801-02.
The majority's analysis is unconvincing because the Court does not actually address the
question of the condition's relation to the expenditure. Chief Justice Rehnquist admits that
this requirement was created by the Court "without significant elaboration." Id. at 2796
(majority opinion). Nevertheless, the Chief Justice still claims to apply the relatedness test
even though the Court has not attempted to define it. Id. at 2797. As long as the Court
adheres to the coercion test, Congress is free to use the federal purse to "encourage" states
to implement congressional objectives regardless of their nature. Justice O'Connor has for-
mulated the correct approach, but has failed to persuade her colleagues to abandon the
coercion test. Until the Court does reject the coercion test, Justice O'Connor's proposal is,
for all practical purposes, irrelevant. See supra notes 164-76 and accompanying text; see
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Suppose that Congress, for example, establishes a national
fund to provide grants to municipalities for the purpose of estab-
lishing paramedic emergency services. Congress may conclude that
helping communities improve their emergency health services
would promote the general welfare. To assure that the services are
effective, Congress can require that each community, in order to
qualify for the funds, submit a study to a federal agency demon-
strating the need for the improvements. Congress may not, how-
ever, rely on the spending power to support an additional condi-
tion requiring community high schools to teach first aid and
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). The condition relates to the
national interest in providing emergency health services, but does
not relate to the specific purpose of the expenditure-the
establishment of paramedic services. The requirement, therefore, is
not authorized under the spending clause, but may be valid as a
regulation under another of Congress' regulatory powers.
B. Unauthorized Conditions Permissible as Regulations
A condition that does not assist the objective of the expendi-
ture nevertheless may be valid if supported by another regulatory
power.1"3 The Supreme Court has not expressly articulated this
analysis, but has implied that the approach is valid. Because of the
problems associated with a coercion analysis, the Court at times
has avoided determining what conditions the spending power itself
supports, choosing instead to find support for conditions in Con-
gress' other powers.
184
The Court implicitly adopted this approach in Fullilove v.
Klutznick.185 Fullilove examined the validity of the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977, which appropriated to state and local
governments four billion dollars for use in local public works
also Dole, 107 S. Ct. at 2799 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
183. Cf. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591 (1937). It is well established
that legislation invalidly enacted under one of Congress' powers, but valid under another,
will be upheld. See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948); United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 61 (1936).
184. Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 590. In Steward Machine Co. the Court chose
to evaluate conditions according to whether they were "fairly within the scope of national
policy and power," id., suggesting that the conditions would be valid if they could stand
unattached to an expenditure. Id. at 586 (holding that, in order to be deemed unlawful,
"[tihere must be a showing in the first place that separated from the credit the revenue
provisions are incapable of standing by themselves").
185. 448 U.S. 448, 475 (1980) (stating that "[i]f, pursuant to its regulatory powers,
Congress could have achieved the objectives of the [Minority Business Enterprise] program,
then it may do so under the Spending Power").
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projects. Congress attached to each grant the condition that a lo-
cality must assign to minority business enterprises ten percent of
the proceeds from any grant for local public works projects. 86 The
Court's analysis did not address whether the spending power au-
thorized the condition, but instead found authorization in the com-
merce power and the fourteenth amendment.'
Allowing Congress' other enumerated powers to support condi-
tions unauthorized by the spending power provides the deference
typically granted to Congress by the Court. In McCulloch v. Mary-
land"" the Court held that the necessary and proper clause allows
Congress to choose the means by which it pursues a constitution-
ally permissible national objective.8 9 Thus, if Congress chooses to
connect a legitimate interstate commerce restriction to a legitimate
spending objective, the Court probably will not object.9 0
C. Effect of the Proposed Analysis
The requirement that the conditions relate to the objective of
the expenditure does not contradict the Court's holding that the
spending power creates a power independent of Congress' other
enumerated powers. The spending power authorizes a set of condi-
tions that relate to the objective of each expenditure. The other
enumerated powers simply authorize another set of conditions.
Finally, the Court should ask whether the condition offends
any other restriction on Congress' regulatory powers.' The Court
has alluded to this inquiry in several cases, stating in one instance
that Congress may impose conditions on the receipt of federal
funds "absent some independent constitutional bar."'19 Beyond
paying nominal recognition to this concept, however, the Court has
not ventured to explain what "independent constitutional bar" ac-
tually means.19 3 By defining this restriction precisely, the Court
186. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1982).
187. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 475.
188. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
189. Id. at 323-34; see also R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 4, § 5.8(a).
190. It is not necessary that Congress identify the power that it is using to enact a
legislative package. "Today the test for validity of a federal act is whether the Congress
might reasonably find that the act relates to one of the federal powers." R. ROTUNDA, J.
NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 4, § 3.3.
191. Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985).
192. Id.
193. The Court, most recently, referred to the requirement in South Dakota v. Dole,
107 S. Ct. 2793, 2796 (1987) (stating that "other constitutional provisions may provide an
independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds"). For support the court cited
Lawrence County, Buckley, and King v. Smith. Id. at 2796-97. Lawrence County states
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could prevent Congress from using spending conditions to circum-
vent restrictions on direct regulation.""'
This new test would not have changed the outcome of most
prior Supreme Court decisions, but would provide the courts with
a clearer and more appropriate test to apply in the wake of Con-
gress' current aggressive use of conditional grants. The adoption of
this test would allow courts, when evaluating new conditional grant
programs, to consult already widely accepted analyses of Congress'
enumerated powers.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court has not completely defined the extent to which
Congress may place conditions on spending grants,19 5 relying in-
stead on the coercion test to curb the conditioning power. The co-
ercion test, however, is not capable of invalidating any condition to
a spending provision."9 6 Thus, use of the coercion test has allowed
Congress to employ grant schemes as a means of avoiding the con-
stitutional restrictions on the use of its powers.197 The Constitution
does not permit Congress to legislate for the general welfare,' 8
though the current spending power analysis and the coercion test
simply that "Congress may impose conditions on the receipt of federal funds, absent some
independent constitutional bar." Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 269-70. For support, Law-
rence County cites King. See id.; see also King, 329 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968). Buckley
makes no direct reference to the "independent constitutional bar" but states in passing with
no elaboration or support that "[a]ny limitations upon the exercise of that granted power
must be found elsewhere in the Constitution." Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) (per curiam).
Lawrence County and Dole cite a footnote in King for support. That note states simply that
"[tihere is of course no question that the Federal Government, unless barred by some con-
trolling constitutional prohibition, may impose the terms and conditions upon which its
money allotments to the States shall be disbursed." King, 392 U.S. at 333 n.34. The footnote
also provides no explanation but cites generally to Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCraken,
357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958), and Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S.
127, 143 (1947). Ivanhoe and Oklahoma merely restate Congress' power to place conditions
on federal grants. Ivanhoe, 357 U.S. at 295 (indicating that "also beyond challenge is the
power of the Federal Government to impose reasonable conditions on the use of federal
funds, federal property, and federal privileges"); Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 143 (stating that
Congress "does have power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to states shall
be disbursed").
The King footnote was apparently the beginning of a restriction that never was. See
Austin, Footnotes as Product Differentiation, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1135 n.17 (1987).
194. See supra notes 131-51 and accompanying text.
195. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 475 (1980); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 596
(1974).
196. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 131-51 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
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essentially give Congress this ability.199 The courts200 can resolve
this inconsistency by limiting the strings on federal spending pro-
grams to conditions that are directly related to the objective of
each expenditure and regulations allowed by the other regulatory
powers.201 Both the conditions and the regulations also must be
subject to the restrictions of the various constitutional limitations
and amendments. 2  This approach will further the framers' prom-
ise of a federal government of limited powers.
2 03
Congress' use of the spending power, with its accompanying
authority to impose conditions on grants, has created an under-
ground network of additional federal regulation affecting political
accountability, the tenth and twenty-first amendments, and the
balance of power between state and federal governments. The re-
sult has been an alteration of the fundamental federal structure
established by the Constitution. When examining the constitution-
ality of restrictions on federal grants to the states, the Court
should not simply conclude that the states have the option to re-
fuse the benefit and thereby escape any accompanying restrictions.
Rather, the Court should determine whether Congress has the
power, presumably under the spending or the commerce powers, to
place the restriction on the states in the first place. If any power
supports the restriction, then the Court must determine whether
the condition violates an independent constitutional bar. 204 Only
199. See supra notes 131-59 and accompanying text.
200. See Texas v. United States, 730 F.2d 339, 355 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that
"[r]egardless of whether Congress acts in a politically accountable manner, the courts must
be prepared to intervene to protect the essential role of the states in the federal system"),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984).
201. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
202. Kreimer, supra note 100, at 1396. Professor Kreimer concluded "that courts seek-
ing to protect constitutional liberties run severe risks if they exempt allocational sanctions
from constitutional scrutiny." Id.
203. Schweppe, supra note 29, at 1276. Dean Schweppe expressed a similar frustration
with the spending power doctrine: "The political result is the spending of lavish sums by
Congress for purposes that would have made the Founding Fathers scrap the Constitution
could they have envisioned that perversion of their image of a limited federal government."
Id.
This Note does not attempt to reevaluate the Court's deference to Congress in making
determinations regarding whether a spending objective pursues the general welfare. Defer-
ence should not be given to Congress in determining whether a condition is related to the
spending objective, which would undermine any conclusion that the coercion test is
inadequate.
204. Congress, for example, may not affirmatively require a state to enact legislation.
See EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99, 103 (1977) (per curiam) (suggesting that the federal govern-
ment could not require the states to enact legislation); see also Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-62 (1982) (noting that the Court has never explic-
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after applying this analysis will the Court have squarely evaluated
Congress' conduct within the limitations of the Constitution.
DONALD J. MIZERK*
itly sanctioned federal directives requiring states to promulgate laws and regulations).
* The Author would like to thank Barry Friedman, Assistant Professor of Law at Van-
derbilt School of Law, for his comments on an earlier draft of this Note.
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